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The symposium published here began life as a somewhat unusual ‘author meets critics’ session at 
the British Society of Aesthetics annual conference, St Anne’s College, Oxford, on 16 September 
2016 – unusual inasmuch as the focus was not on a single book, but on two books exploring 
different but related themes. In addition, rather than encompassing all of the issues these two books 
address, the session focused on one general question that both books explore in some depth: is 
psychology relevant to aesthetics? 
When George Dickie posed the very same question in 1962, he answered with a resounding ‘no’, 
and many others have taken and still hold a similar view. But a naturalistic approach to aesthetics, 
drawing on the knowledge and methods of the sciences and especially the cognitive sciences, has a 
long history and is experiencing a resurgence in contemporary aesthetics. Dickie, who was 
responding to an earlier wave of naturalism over the first half the twentieth century, concludes his 
essay with a kind of invitation and challenge: no-one, he argues, has ‘made clear how any specific 
psychological information is relevant to [aesthetic] problems. Not only has this matter not been 
made clear in any specific instance, but no one appears to have any idea what sort of procedure 
should be followed to establish the relevance relation under discussion.’1 The BSA ‘double header’ 
panel took up Dickie’s invitation, exploring two distinctive, positive answers to the question he had 
posed.  
Bence Nanay’s Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception explores various ways in which 
philosophy of perception is a useful tool in relation to a number of questions in aesthetics, with 
special emphasis on the concept of attention.2 Nanay argues that attention plays a crucial but under-
explored role in a number of aesthetic phenomena, including our engagement with art. In order to 
apply the conceptual apparatus of philosophy of perception, including those parts of it concerned 
with attention, however, we need to be conversant with the psychological findings about attention 
and about perception and the mind in general. In other words, Nanay proposes an indirect use of 
psychology in aesthetics: aesthetics would benefit (and has historically benefited) from closer 
attention to the philosophy of perception. And the philosophy of perception we draw upon should 
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be consistent with and informed by the empirical sciences of the mind, especially psychology. In 
short, the relevance of psychology for aesthetics is mediated by philosophy of perception. Many 
case studies of such a methodology are given in his book, from the distinction between focused and 
distributed attention to debates about the cognitive penetrability of perception and cross-cultural 
variations in a range of perceptual phenomena. 
Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film aims to 
articulate a ‘third cultural’, naturalized aesthetics integrating humanistic with scientific methods, 
with a particular focus on aspects of emotional response to films and other aesthetic objects.3 Smith 
argues that we are best placed to understand and explain our experience of artworks – including our 
emotional responses to them – by exploring the interconnections among the three different types of 
evidence at our disposal in relation to mental phenomena in general: phenomenological, 
psychological, and neuroscientific evidence. This model of ‘triangulation’ is explicated by Smith 
via case studies on such ‘art-affects’ as suspense, empathy, the startle response, and the expression 
and perception of emotion in the face. In seeking to relate these distinct types of evidence to one 
another, Smith makes the case that we need to pay attention to both the personal and subpersonal 
levels of psychological description – to our acts and intentions and reactions and the 
psychophysiological systems that subserve them (the distinct visual pathways for action and object 
recognition, the body clock, the neural mirror system, the ‘affect programmes’ underpinning our 
basic emotions, and so on). And in a manner parallel with Nanay, Smith argues that philosophical 
theorizing in relation to artistic creation and appreciation cannot proceed in isolation from 
psychological research. Insofar as the arts not only exploit but extend and stretch our ordinary 
perceptual, cognitive, and emotional capacities, affording us experiences that generally do not arise 
in ordinary settings, aesthetic theory must at once be attentive to the psychology of ordinary human 
behaviour, and work towards a psychology of specifically aesthetic behaviour. Triangulation, then, 
articulates the ‘relevance relation’ that Dickie seeks: psychology is relevant to aesthetics because 
aesthetic experience is a species of conscious mental activity, and such activity is best illuminated 
by seeking consilience among the three types of evidence available to us. 
While the two books have somewhat different foci, both discuss aspects of Dickie’s sceptical 
arguments concerning psychology and the aesthetic attitude,4 and both pay notable attention to film. 
Smith’s book sets out its arguments about film alongside parallel exploration of other media and 
artforms; Nanay’s study ranges widely across the arts and other domains of aesthetic experience, 
while paying considerable attention to film. Both books orient themselves towards metaphysics and 
                                               
3  Murray Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
4  Indeed Smith refers to Nanay’s arguments in this regard: ibid., 31–32. 
  
epistemology, broadly construed, rather than towards questions of value.5 Sherri Irvin and Elisabeth 
Schellekens each provide a commentary which reflects on aspects of both books, commentaries 
which – among other things – make salient the shared concerns and points of convergence between 
the two books, including a focus on aesthetic attention and experience, and (as Schellekens puts it) 
the ‘metaphilosophy of aesthetics’.6 As Schellekens also notes, both books seek to establish 
‘generous frameworks of communication and reference’ with the sciences and other branches of 
philosophy with which they engage, in contrast to the parallel but rather separate conversations of 
the past.7 To that extent, the ambition of both books is to create a space for an authentic third 
culture. Nanay and Smith each provide a response to the two commentaries, once again reflecting 
on the points of similarity and difference between their respective books, as well as responding to 
the comments of Irvin and Schellekens. 
 
Murray Smith 
Department of Film, University of Kent, 
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FACT8 takes as its starting point a historical coincidence: at the time of the completion of the book, 
sixty years had passed since the publication of C. P. Snow’s first published intervention on the topic 
of the ‘two cultures’, in 1956. Snow’s arguments on this topic were to ignite a major intellectual 
debate across the next decade and beyond, highly visible in the public sphere on both sides of the 
Atlantic. A Cambridge physicist turned novelist and politician, Snow’s career journey was integral 
to the view he advanced: that there was a pernicious, and worsening, divide between the ‘cultures’ 
of the natural sciences on the one hand, and the humanities (‘literary intellectuals’) on the other 
hand; and that the divide was harmful both intellectually and in terms of the practical relevance and 
benefits of academic research (what in Britain is now officially termed ‘impact’). Snow did 
envisage, however, the possibility (and indeed existing pockets of) a ‘third culture’, in which 
scientists and humanists were ‘on speaking terms’.9 This vision of a third culture, I argue, mirrors in 
the public sphere the naturalistic tradition in philosophy – a tradition that, while consolidating itself 
under that label in the twentieth century, can be traced all the way back through the Enlightenment 
to Aristotle.  
Naturalistically conceived, philosophy is closely aligned with science and empirical enquiry. 
Within the sphere of analytic philosophy, naturalism is a highly-influential, indeed probably the 
dominant, approach to philosophy. It has exerted some influence on aesthetics, especially in recent 
years, but it has been less visible in aesthetics and the philosophy of art than, say, in the 
philosophies of mind, science, and even ethics. Chapter 1 of FACT, ‘Aesthetics Naturalized’, 
reviews some of the history and sets out the case for a naturalized aesthetics. Theory construction, 
as distinct from conceptual analysis, is fundamental to a naturalistic approach, I argue – where 
theory construction involves a constant interplay between conceptual clarification and empirical 
enquiry, in contrast to the strict separation of these two activities in (at least orthodox) conceptual 
analysis. (It is interesting to note that Dickie, in writing of the ‘myth of the aesthetic attitude’ in 
another important essay published not long after his ‘Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?’, was in 
effect pursuing theory construction by holding the concept of the ‘aesthetic attitude’ to an empirical 
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as well as conceptual standard. For that is exactly what is implied by the word ‘myth’; if the 
‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, it is no more deserving of a place in our thinking about aesthetic 
experience than is miasma in our thinking about the transmission of disease.)10 Chapter 1 also 
introduces the idea of thick explanation. While thick description – a well-established method in the 
humanities – involves a richly-contextualised description and interpretation of a human behaviour 
or practice, thick explanation involves the integration of the personal and subpersonal levels of 
description (rather than treating these as mutually exclusive or incompatible perspectives on the 
mind). 
Chapter 2, ‘Triangulating Aesthetic Experience’, sets out an approach to aesthetic experience 
consistent with theory construction. The method of ‘triangulation’ involves the integration of the 
three kinds of evidence available to us in relation to the mind in general: phenomenological, 
psychological, and neurophysiological evidence. As Schellekens observes in her commentary on 
FACT, when combined these elements give us the kind of thick explanation limned in Chapter 1; 
and in doing so ‘the door is opened to admit, at least in a limited and principled fashion, the first-
person perspective within a scientific approach to the mind’.11 In the context of philosophy of mind, 
such triangulation occupies a middle ground between, on the one hand, radical functionalism 
(which gives little or no weight to the significance of neural evidence), and neurofundamentalism 
(which holds that, in the long run at least, the brain will tell us everything there is to know about the 
mind). If the eliminativism of the Churchlands constitutes an example of the latter, some of the late 
Jerry Fodor’s skeptical writings on brain scanning provide an instance of the former. A further 
important feature of triangulation is that no one of the three forms of evidence is held to be more 
important than any other, each form of evidence, considered in isolation, having its limitations. 
Across the chapter, I explore and test the model of triangulation in relation to various films and a 
related range of aesthetic experiences, with case studies on suspense and empathy. While suspense 
and empathy certainly arise outside of aesthetic contexts, they are pervasive enough within the arts 
that we might consider them basic aesthetic emotions.  
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the two types of evidence at stake in the model of triangulation which 
might seem most distant from one another, and most in need of defence as elements of an 
explanatory scheme: phenomenological and neuroscientific evidence. Chapter 3, ‘The Engine of 
Reason and the Pit of Naturalism’, considers in detail various neuroskeptical arguments, from both 
the philosophy of mind and philosophical aesthetics. These arguments, and various responses to 
them, are considered through case studies on the startle response and affective mimicry, 
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demonstrating the contribution made by neuroscientific findings (especially concerning mirror 
neurons) to these psychological and aesthetic phenomena. Chapter 4, ‘Papaya, Pomegranates, and 
Green Tea’, turns its attention to the burgeoning field of consciousness studies, and the complex 
history of debate about the nature of mind and conscious experience lying behind this contemporary 
trend. I explore the way consciousness has been represented in various traditions of filmmaking, 
and the ineliminable centrality of conscious qualia to aesthetic experience. 
Chapters 1 through 4 constitute Part I of the book, ‘Building the Third Culture’. Taken together, 
they aim to set out and defend the idea of a third culture, as well as a set of principles and methods 
through which such an intellectual culture can be realised. Part II of FACT, ‘Science and 
Sentiment’, sets these principles and methods in motion in relation to the affective and emotional 
life of cinema – the ways in which films both represent and elicit emotions – as well as sustaining 
the theory building of Part I. 
Chapter 5, ‘Who’s Afraid of Charles Darwin?’, explores the expression of emotion in film, 
through gesture, posture, the voice, and above all the face, against the backdrop of Darwin’s The 
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872). Here I consider the vicissitudes of Darwin’s 
evolutionary account of emotion, including the rehabilitation and refinement of a Darwinian 
perspective in the hands of contemporary psychologists such as Paul Ekman and Dacher Keltner. 
The chapter explores the treatment of emotional expression in a range of filmmaking traditions, as 
well as arguments in early and classical film theory concerning the (assumed or hoped for) 
universality of emotion in film, especially in the ‘silent’ era prior to the introduction of the ‘talkies’. 
Chapter 6, ‘What Difference Does It Make?’, continues to explore contemporary research on and 
theories of emotion, with a particular emphasis on the role of culture in emotional experience. 
Rejecting Hobson’s choice – and the false dichotomy that stands behind it – between a narrowly 
biological account of emotion and a ‘culturalist’ perspective according to which biology plays no 
significant role, I defend a biocultural view of emotion (and by extension, of aesthetic experience). 
The emotion of disgust, for example, may have evolved in the first instance as a barrier against 
contact with and ingestion of physically harmful substances (faeces, vomit, rotten food) which 
hardly vary across cultures. But the bodily systems supporting such ‘core’ disgust can also be 
recruited by our higher-order belief systems, such that we can experience disgust in relation to 
much more variable sociocultural acts and objects. (In a similar spirit, Nanay argues that the ‘the 
top-down influences on our perception that make perception very different in different time periods 
and different parts of the world […] force us to take the cultural variations of our aesthetic 
engagement seriously, paving the way to a truly global aesthetics’.)12 
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Chapter 7, ‘Empathy, Expansionism, and the Extended Mind’, focuses on empathy and a family 
of related affective states, continuing the exploration of such states begun in Chapters 2 and 3, and 
developed in the final section of Chapter 5. Here the emphasis is both ‘downward’, in the direction 
of the neural mirroring systems which subtend aspects of empathy, and ‘outward’ towards the 
environment – the world beyond the skin and the skull into which the mind extends itself, according 
to advocates of the theory of the extended mind. I argue that the overlapping practices and 
institutions of storytelling, depiction, and ‘fictioning’ (creating fictions) form a major aspect of the 
extended mind, greatly enhancing our ability to represent and reflect on the problems – many of 
them ethical problems – arising from interpersonal and larger social interactions. Elaborating 
further on the biocultural underpinning of the theory of emotion developed across Part II, I link 
these practices and institutions, and the idea of the extended mind more generally, with niche 
construction: the capacity of species to adapt the environment to its needs (even as those species are 
subject to the pressures of natural selection, that is, to the pressure to adapt to the environment). 
Culture, one might argue, is nothing other than niche construction writ large.  
Chapter 8, ‘Feeling Prufish’, pushes beyond the ‘garden variety’ emotions (happiness, fear, 
anger, and the like) which form the basis of most discussions of emotion in both the philosophy of 
mind and philosophical aesthetics. A comprehensive theory of emotion in film and the arts more 
generally needs to account for both generic emotions, which often form the basis of specific genres 
of art – as in the cases of comedy and horror, for example – and the more peculiar blends of 
emotion to which individual works often give expression. To the extent that the theory presented 
achieves this, it also shows how any tension between the particularizing tendency of art, and the 
generalizing impetus of both the sciences and of philosophy, can be reconciled. A naturalistic 
account of the role of emotion in art is well-placed to explain both the patterns and regularities in 
the world of aesthetics and the arts, as well as the particularities of individual works which at once 
emerge from, and stand out against the backdrop of, such regularities. 
 
Murray Smith 
Department of Film, University of Kent, 
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Bence Nanay and I can count ourselves lucky, at least three times over, in relation to the 
symposium published here. We were fortunate first of all, and above all, to find two expert and 
generous commentators in Sherri Irvin and Elisabeth Schellekens. Our next wave of luck came with 
the acceptance of the panel by the BSA conference committee, chaired by David Davies and Dawn 
Wilson. Fortune favoured us a third time with the invitation to publish the papers from the 
symposium in Estetika; our thanks to Hanne Appelqvist for giving her blessing to the plan as the 
incoming editor of the journal. . 
Turning now to the issues raised by our commentators: in her commentary, Irvin recognises the 
centrality of the triangulation model to the project advanced in FACT – the effort to co-ordinate 
evidence from introspection and phenomenal reflection, psychology, and neuroscience in the study 
of the mind in general, and in relation to aesthetics and aesthetic experience in particular. In 
commenting on the model and the book, Irvin points to a number of ways in which we share 
common ground. In agreement with both Irvin and Schellekens – and indeed I believe with Nanay – 
I take the clarification and explanation of aesthetic experience to be central to the enterprise of 
philosophical aesthetics. Irvin also registers the ‘anti-reductivist flavour’ of FACT, notwithstanding 
the seriousness with which I take (neuro)science.13 One way in which this is manifest, as Irvin 
notes,14 is in my concern with the overreaching and ‘over-interpretation’ widespread in cognitive 
neuroscience, where very bold claims and speculative edifices are built on the basis of preliminary 
and often very limited neural evidence. The most sustained critique of this tendency is to be found 
in Chapter 2 of FACT, where I coin the expression ‘neural behaviourism’ to describe and refer to 
that strain of neuroscience which treats neurophysiological evidence as if it speaks for itself – as if 
it is meaningful without being intermapped onto evidence from experience and psychological 
theory. 
But Irvin has doubts about the the level of confidence that I place in neuroscience (or at least the 
neuroscience currently available to us): the findings of contemporary neuroscience, she states, ‘tend 
to be pretty primitive’ and ‘coarse-grained’.15 More specifically and more fundamentally, Irvin 
challenges my view that there is an ‘interdependence’ among the three types or levels of evidence 
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which makes it impossible to hierarchize their significance. She argues that, at least with respect to 
aesthetic experience, there is an asymmetry among the levels which makes phenomenological 
evidence – the evidence of experience itself – the most significant kind of evidence available to us. 
She holds this because ‘when it comes to art and aesthetic experience, the phenomenological is 
irreducibly not just one of the legitimate targets of our interest, but the primary one’.16 Irvin also 
contends that, so long as we hold that mental properties supervene on neural properties, 
psychological evidence takes priority over neural evidence. I’ll return to the topic of supervenience 
shortly. But the immediate point to take stock of is that, on Irvin’s view, in contrast to mine, there is 
a clear hierarchy among the three types of evidence ingredient to triangulation, in which 
phenomenology is at the top and neurophysiology at the bottom (neural evidence is ‘subservient’ to 
the other kinds of evidence).17  
Note, however, that there appears to be a strong and a weak version of Irvin’s objection to the 
role of neuroscience in aesthetics. Certain passages in her commentary imply that the problem is (or 
might be) that neuroscience is too early in its development as a science either to make much of a 
contribution, or for us to know whether it might make such a contribution, to our understanding of 
aesthetic experience: ‘the suggestion that the three levels exist in “a tail-chasing form of 
interdependence” strikes me as premature: the present coarse-grained state of much neuroscientific 
knowledge doesn’t permit it to have a very robust explanatory role. It remains to be seen whether 
the apparent primacy of the experiential level will recede as the underlying neuroscience becomes 
more sophisticated.’18 Other passages imply a stronger, more conceptual objection, based on the 
fact that both our experiences and our psychological capacities supervene on neural states and 
processes. Given this, Irvin argues, ‘the prospect of neurophysiological data making an independent 
contribution to aesthetic theorizing, even once the science is far more advanced’ is in doubt.19 
Here it is important to introduce two rejoinders to the strong version of Irvin’s objection. The 
first concerns the peculiar status and role of experiential evidence in the model of triangulation 
advanced by FACT. Such experience, I argue, plays a dual role in theories of aesthetic experience: it 
functions as both explanandum and explanans.20 How can that be? As Irvin stresses, our aesthetic 
experience – whether of artworks, natural phenomena, or the facets of everyday experience – is the 
very thing which theories of aesthetic experience seek to explain. But I contend that, additionally, 
what we have to say about aesthetic experience – the way it feels to us; the way we characterise it – 
plays a role in our explanations of such experience. This is one of the peculiarities of the science of 
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the mind which marks it off from all other domains of science, where the pursuit of the ‘view from 
nowhere’ is an appropriate governing ideal. That ideal of course has an important place in the 
cognitive sciences as well. But unless we take the stance that the ‘view from somewhere’ – the data 
of first-personal experience – is entirely epiphenomenal, and perhaps even if we do take that stance, 
experiential evidence is bound to figure in our explanations, even if such evidence is defeasible.  
To take one example from FACT: according to the orthodox theory of suspense, suspense arises 
when in engaging with an unfolding sequence of events, we hope for certain outcomes, fear for 
others, and crucially, lack knowledge of the outcome. But this gives rise to the problem of 
‘anomalous suspense’21 – the apparent experience of suspense in contexts where we do know the 
outcome of the narrative in question (either because it is a well-known real-world narrative, or 
because of repeated engagements with specific fictional narratives). Various solutions to this 
problem are possible, some of which hold that the emotion we experience in such contexts really is 
suspense. But if we wish to defend the idea that suspense is or can be experienced where we already 
know the outcome of a narrative, experiential evidence will be relevant. Thus when my body 
tightens up at the prospect of the hijacking of the flight depicted in United 93, and it feels to me like 
I am experiencing suspense in relation to that possible event, that counts as one form of evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that I am experiencing suspense. 
We need to be careful here with regard to what the evidence of experience is evidence of – what 
exactly is the explanandum? There are two candidates: our experience itself, and the psychological 
capacity associated with the experience. Can our experience be evidence of our experience? There 
is something worryingly circular about that thought. Our experience (qua experience) just is 
constitutive of what we want to explain, and in that sense, we can’t be wrong about our experience. 
But we can be mistaken about the psychological skill or capacity the exercise of which creates the 
experience. As I note in FACT, our ordinary experience gives us the impression that our visual 
system affords us a uniformly coloured and detailed visual field. But as research on peripheral 
vision and on inattentional and change blindness shows, it doesn’t!22 (The same may be true of 
suspense; our experience of what feels like suspense in anomalous cases, like those noted above, 
may be misleading; the jury is out.) Thus it is cogent to think of our visual experience as evidence 
for our skills – misleading evidence, as it turns out in this case – in a way that it isn’t cogent to think 
experience as evidence of experience. 
My second response to the strong version of Irvin’s objection focusses on the role of 
supervenience. Irvin and I are in agreement ‘that the phenomenological and the functional/cognitive 
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supervene on the physiological’.23 But we differ on the significance of this relationship. While I 
grant that there is an ontological hierarchy among the levels,24 I insist on two further points. First, 
that the more basic level of neurophysiology in the ontological hierarchy should not lead us to make 
any fallacious inferences about the (ir)reality of psychological states or conscious experiences: the 
ontological hierarchy gives us no reason to think that the mind in general or consciousness in 
particular are any less real than the brain states on which they supervene. Although Irvin does not 
address this point, I am confident that here, too, we are in agreement.  
Where there is a difference, if not a disagreement, between us concerns the nature of 
triangulation. At least by implication, Irvin treats triangulation as an ontological claim; that is what 
the supervenience relation describes. But I frame triangulation in methodological terms: ‘no item 
within these bodies of evidence is insulated from revision or rejection – so elimination of even long-
established, cherished beliefs and theories is certainly possible. In addition, no straightforward 
methodological hierarchy among the three levels of analysis is established: no one of the three types 
of evidence necessarily overrules the others.’25  The idea here is that, in our search for an 
understanding of the mind and of aesthetic experience, we can begin with evidence of any type – 
experiential, functional, neural – as all of them will (or at least can) lead us into the space of 
explanation, where any given piece of evidence may intersect with any other. I grant that, given 
supervenience, differences at the base level of the brain may not manifest in differences at the 
supervening level of the mind; but of course they can and often do, and that is all that is necessary 
to ‘license’ attention to neural evidence from a methodological point of view. The example of 
mirror neurons is telling in this respect: mirror neurons were initially discovered by accident when 
the neuroscientists involved were running experiments designed to test for a quite different set of 
hypotheses about brain function in macaque monkeys.26 But once this unexpected and anomalous 
neural data was on the table, hypotheses about the functional and experiential states it might be 
underpinning could be (and were) framed. Note that this is why I precisely don’t claim that 
‘neurophysiological data [makes] an independent contribution to aesthetic theorizing’,27 but rather 
that it exists in a relation of interdependence with functional and experiential states. This 
interdependence claim cuts both ways as far as neuroscience is concerned – neural evidence is 
given a significant role, but it degenerates into meaningless ‘neurobabble’ if cut loose from 
experiential and functional evidence and interpretation. 
One might also make this methodological point in epistemological terms: triangulation bears 
upon how we gain knowledge of the mind – how we discover its mechanisms, processes, and other 
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27  Irvin, ‘Nature of Aesthetic Experience’, x (my emphasis). 
  
characteristics. It leaves the ontological hierarchy, described by the supervenience relation, intact. 
Ontologically, a tiger is a tiger because of its genetic make up; but we get to know if a tiger is a tiger 
by looking at its observable features and behaviour. What cuts ice epistemically may be 
ontologically blunt. 
What more can be said in support of the methodological and epistemological value of 
triangulation in general, and the neural level of evidence embedded within it in particular? In a 
striking passage which resonates strongly with those trends in contemporary philosophy of mind 
which accord substantial weight to the body and the brain – such as embodied and 4EA accounts of 
the mind – Darwin recorded the following thought in one of his notebooks:  
 
To study Metaphysic, as they have always been studied, appears to me to be like puzzling at Astronomy without 
Mechanics. – Experience shows the problem of the mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself. – The mind 
is a function of the body. – We must bring some stable foundation to argue from.28 
 
We might consider Darwin’s idea here in connection with the literature on biological motion. It is 
now well-established within perceptual psychology that our minds are adapted to detecting the 
distinctive contours and rhythms of biological motion, as it is manifest in the movement of humans 
and other animal species. Among the possible forms of motion, biological motion is quite 
distinctive, and quite different from the artificial, technologically-enhanced forms of motion we 
humans have invented. (Of course, it is a racing certainty that some future technologies will emulate 
biological motion, for various purposes.) And the distinctiveness of biological motion is ineluctably 
tied up with – one might even say constituted by – the bodily forms of animals. Darwin is inviting 
us to make the leap and accept that the mind, just as surely if rather more subtlety, is tied up with 
the form of the body and the brain (the brain being nothing other than a particularly intricate part of 
the body): ‘The mind is a function of the body.’ John Searle, Patricia and Paul Churchland, and a 
great many other contemporary philosophers of mind would agree. Searle, for example, has argued 
that ‘the brain is a biological organ, like any other, and consciousness is as much a biological 
process as digestion or photosynthesis’.29 The mind cannot be understood without an understanding 
of its architecture, and the architecture of the mind depends at least in part on the architecture of the 
brain (or the brain-and-body). We can speak not only of biological motion, but of biological 
cognition. 
                                               
28  Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844: Geology, Transmutation of Species, Metaphysical 
Enquiries, ed. Paul H. Barrett et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Notebook N, 564; quoted in 
Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 57, 64. 
29  John R. Searle, ‘Consciousness and the Philosophers’, review of The Conscious Mind: In Search of a 
Fundamental Theory, by David J. Chalmers, New York Review of Books, 6 March 1997, 50. 
  
On this view, the brain is the vehicle of biology, the organ that evolved in the human species in 
such a way as to create a behavioural and cognitive gulf between homo sapiens and all other 
species. But we should not take talk of biological cognition to exclude culture as another shaping 
force in human cognition. As I argue in Chapter 6, phylogenetically speaking, culture emerged from 
our biology and then developed as as an additional domain in which human cognition is forged, in 
tandem with underlying biological processes; according to one version of this view, human 
evolution has occurred through ‘gene-meme co-evolution’.30 From an ontogenetic and development 
point of view, the psychology we are left with must be understood in biocultural terms; talk of 
‘biological cognition’ is not intended to deny or obscure the importance of culture in cognition.31 
Culturally-shaped cognition is to biological cognition as artefactual motion is to biological motion: 
both artefactual motion and cultural cognition build on affordances in their respective domains, for 
movement in the physical world and thought in the space of biological cognition.  
Schellekens, like Irvin, puts the nature of aesthetic experience at the centre of her response, 
recognising the centrality of the issue to both FACT and Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. 
She notes that both books are concerned with what is ‘phenomenologically distinct about aesthetic 
experience’, 32  arguing that this is a crucial litmus test for any naturalistic account, since 
(Schellekens contends) naturalism tends to be reductive, erasing the very distinctiveness that it must 
capture and explain in order to succeed. Irvin, as we have seen, remarks on the efforts I make to 
resist such reduction, giving rise to the ‘anti-reductivist’ aroma of FACT. Schellekens captures my 
characterisation of aesthetic experience very effectively, drawing on the term retrospection to evoke 
both the idea of ‘savouring’ rather than merely having an experience, and to point to the complex 
temporality and reflexive intentionality implied by this conception of aesthetic experience. ‘This 
“savouring” or “retrospection”,’ Schellekens writes,  
 
combines a whole host of states and abilities both in what we might call its production, its phenomenology and its 
aftermath. It is not only reflective and emotionally laden, it is also self-reflective and affectively enjoyed as 
reflection or retrospection. We have an experience, and at the same time an experience of that experience: aesthetic 
experiences are enjoyed, felt and retrospected upon in a special way qua objects of a special form of self-
consciousness which is distinctive of aesthetic attention.33  
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In her commentary, Irvin sounds a note of dissent – or least notes an important qualification – on 
this topic, to the effect that ‘savouring does not necessarily imply enjoyment, but it does imply 
really tasting as opposed to just absently swallowing’.34 While the pleasurable character of aesthetic 
experiences of which Schellekens writes – such experiences are ‘enjoyed’ – appears to have a kind 
of normative weight, neutral or negative aesthetic experiences are surely not only possible, but part 
of the landscape of actual aesthetic experience. True, we ought to seek positive aesthetic 
experiences, but often enough they fail or disappoint. Likewise we ought to seek the right and the 
good – but things don’t always work out that way. ‘Disvalue’ is an aspect of both ethics and 
aesthetics.35 So what is basic to aesthetic experience in this respect is keen and self-conscious 
attention to the quality of the experience, however pleasurable or otherwise the experience turns out 
to be. 
Schellekens’s description, taken alongside Irvin’s qualification, captures very well the kind of 
aesthetic experience I strive to theorize in FACT.36 But Schellekens worries, if I can pursue the 
metaphor introduced by Irvin, that all may not be well underneath the aroma and the flavour of the 
account. The description of the phenomenon to be explained – aesthetic experience – may be 
attractive; the naturalistic theory advanced to explain it is greeted more cautiously. Schellekens 
worries in particular that I am ‘trying to fit too much into the account of what is supposed to be our 
distinctly aesthetic phenomenology’.37 I take it that Schellekens’s worry here arises from the very 
‘thickness’ of the thick explanation that, as we have seen, she rightly adduces goes hand in hand 
with the methodology of triangulation. If everything from neural networks and mental modules to 
selection pressures and evolutionary niches to affect programs and extended minds goes into the 
theoretical mix, what hope is there that the intricate structure of retrospection is going to survive, let 
alone be discerned and explained? 
Here again it is important to hang on to the explanandum–explanans distinction. The 
introduction of those items which seem most alien to descriptions and explanations of aesthetic 
experience, including neuroscientific evidence, reference to subpersonal mechanisms and processes, 
as well as the adaptive unconscious and implicit bias, play their role in the engine room of 
explanation. They bear upon what Schellekens refers to in the quotation above as the ‘production’ 
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of aesthetic experience. Generally speaking, none of these factors show up in our conscious 
experience, even if their consequences do; and so none are part of the content of aesthetic 
experience. ‘Exactly what do we find behind the “door to the first-person perspective within a 
scientific approach to the mind”?’ asks Schellekens.38 We find, exactly, the contents of experience – 
what is available, with all its fallibility and fragility, to introspection and phenomenological 
reflection. The point is ‘simply’ that, to reiterate one that I make above in response to Irvin, such 
reflection is not only the target of explanation, but one type of evidence that we can marshal within 
the explanation of that very target phenomenon. It is easy to understand how, given this dual role, it 
might seem like I am cluttering up the space of aesthetic experience itself with a lot apparatus that 
doesn’t belong there. That is why the explanandum–explanans distinction is so important in this 
context. 
Relating my exploration of Edgar Reisz’ Heimat to Nanay’s treatment of certain works by Paul 
Klee, Schellekens suggests that these analyses may ‘affect’ our experience of the artworks 
concerned.39 As far as FACT is concerned, however, affecting the appreciator’s experience is not 
my primary goal. That’s the job, in the first instance, of the artist via the artwork, and in the second, 
of the critic through their criticism of the work. As a theorist, I would substitute the word ‘explain’ 
for ‘affect’; explanation, once again, is the name of the game in theory construction. I insist upon 
drawing firm lines between three roles we can play in relation to artworks, and the distinct activities 
playing these roles entail: making artworks is distinct from appreciating them, and both are distinct 
from explaining them. That is not to deny that there are points of connection and similarity; nor that 
the same individual can occupy these different roles with respect to the same artwork at different 
times; nor that at a very abstract level, all three activities might be absorbed into some super-
category (of all phenomena related to the aesthetic). The distinct activities of making, appreciating, 
and explaining also relate to Irvin’s sceptical attitude to the relevance of neuroscience, when she 
argues that  
 
we do not need to descend to the physiological level to make sense of [various examples examined in Film, Art, and 
the Third Culture]: as Smith notes, artists know how to manipulate audience attention and exploit unique features of 
the perceptual system in order to produce distinctive aesthetic effects, and their knowledge is derived not from 
neurophysiology but from careful observation of how certain kinds of effects captured on film are productive of 
particular kinds of experience.40  
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As far as the activity of the artist is concerned, I agree. That is why Proust was not a 
neuroscientist.41 But the theorist is engaged in a different activity, and that is why drawing on the 
findings of neuroscience – if not actually doing some neuroscience – takes on a relevance and 
justification for the theorist that it lacks for the artist.  
So Proust wasn’t a neuroscientist in the sense that he didn’t need to draw upon neuroscience (or 
any scientific psychology) in order to create his works; nor do we need to appeal to neuroscience or 
scientific psychology in order to appreciate them. But if we want to theorise and explain why 
Proust’s techniques and novels work as they do – and especially if we want to generate thick 
explanations – then neuroscience (and scientific psychology in general) will be a useful resource. 
Nonetheless, multi-levelled theories such as the one advanced in FACT do face a problem of 
explanatory bloat – if we can move sideways into context, as the advocates of thick description 
urge, and downwards into the physical structures subvening mental states and processes, as I 
contend by defending a parallel notion of thick explanation, where do we draw the line for what is 
to count as explanatorily relevant?  
The problem of explanatory bloat calls for a principle of explanatory relevance. I can’t offer one 
here; but I can suggest the outline of such a principle through an example from FACT. There I make 
the case that in shaping our responses towards the antagonist in Saboteur, through the mechanism of 
affective mimicry, ‘an aspect of the biology of emotions is enlisted [by Hitchcock] in a cultural and 
political cause’.42 And I offer this up as a prime case of thick explanation. But not, I hope, an 
indigestibly thick explanation. The explanation cuts a path across the biological and cultural levels, 
identifying a particular set of causal factors: Hitchcock intuitively understood – he was no more a 
neuroscientist than Proust – through his experience as a filmmaker, how the expressions and 
movements of performers affected audiences, as is evident from both his filmmaking practice and 
his reflections on his craft in interviews. And he was alert to the various constraints and pressures 
his films were subject to (including those of the Production Code Administration, World War II, 
and more broadly, the Hollywood system).  
Schellekens also suggests that ‘questions arise for anyone who seeks to both naturalize (and in 
that sense at least normalize) and customize the aesthetic at the same time’.43 Earlier in the same 
passage she suggests that the alignment of naturalized aesthetics with scientific psychology might 
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be taken as an advantage, insofar as its ‘explanations are grounded in information, facts, evidence, 
or data which in some sense apply across aesthetic agents, regardless of all the purely personal, 
idiosyncratic qualities which can make us such unreliable aesthetic judges’.44 Schellekens’ remarks 
on this topic resonate with the focus of Chapter 8, which seeks to reconcile the traditional emphasis 
on the particularity of art with the impetus towards generalization characteristic of scientific and 
philosophical theorizing. There I argue that the incompatibility between art and these explanatory 
enterprises is more perceived than real: a naturalistic theory of art can both reveal those recurrent 
patterns, widespread practices and shared experiences which are manifest in the aesthetic universe, 
while at the same time setting into relief the unique and particular aspects of individual artworks 
and other aesthetic objects. (Note that Nanay explores the presumed ‘uniqueness’ of artworks, the 
‘completely new and often very rewarding experiences’ that they afford,45 and the implications of 
such uniqueness for aesthetic evaluation in Chapter 6 of Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. He 
concludes, similarly, that the explanatory resources available in the philosophy of perception and 
vision science can shed light on uniqueness in the aesthetic domain.) 
The same principle applies to the idiosyncrasy of individuals. Scientific psychology doesn’t deny 
that individuals vary in a myriad of ways; indeed some branches of psychology – like personality 
psychology – focus on this very fact. Human variability – individual and cultural – is a feature of 
human existence which, one way or another, any scientific approach to human behaviour has to take 
into account. And so this recognition must have a place within a naturalized aesthetics. It is true 
that, when we assess the design features of an artwork, we are seeking to understand how the work 
draws on certain human capacities and existing knowledge in order to create a certain kind of 
experience. But it is no strike against the theory to admit that, where particular perceivers lack the 
appropriate background knowledge, or the perceptual or cognitive or emotional capacities, or the 
right disposition to engage with the work, then the qualia the work is designed to elicit will not 
emerge and the experience will not be had. In fact any other conclusion would be inconsistent with 
the scientific temper of naturalistic philosophy, since the background knowledge, the mental 
capacities, and the appropriate disposition are all causal preconditions for the work to work as it has 
been designed to work.46 Both Nanay, in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Perception, and Todd 
Berliner, in his recent Hollywood Aesthetic, make the point via appeal to expertise.47 Nanay draws 
on evidence to show that while the visual attention of experts ranges across the entire composition 
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of a depiction, lay viewers tend to restrict their attention to a focal object.48 Berliner, meanwhile, 
notes that the ability of a viewer to appreciate properly and to find aesthetic pleasure in a film 
hinges on their level of expertise with the kind of film in question.49 In the context of a tradition like 
Hollywood filmmaking, where seeking a wide audience is central to the practice, making works 
which accommodate viewers possessing different degrees of expertise is an important skill. But the 
crucial point here is that there is no tension between naturalism and the recognition of variability of 
response across individuals and groups. 
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